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ABSTRACT The simplistic, but still inﬂuential, idea of a clear-cut boundary between science
and politics does not capture the complexities of the ongoing “dialogue between science
and politics.” Neither do political scientists live in an ivory tower, nor do they breathe the
air of a separate world. However, the relation between political science practitioners and
the rest of the world remains knotty. In this contribution we outline the value of a focus on
“practical reﬂexivity” to assist in the dialogue with political practice. Based on proposals
from social theory we evaluate six strategies of copingwith the dilemmas of engagingwith
practice. The strategies provide a menu of choice for political scientists, as well as system-
atization of furthering the discussion on practical reﬂexivity.
The simplistic, but still inﬂuential, idea of a clear-cut boundary between science and politics doesnot capture the complexities of the ongoing “dia-logue” between science and politics. Perhaps itnever did. “Critical” research within the social sci-
ences has made this painstakingly clear. Neither do political sci-
entists live in an ivory tower, nor do they breathe the air of a
separate world. Yet, the relation between political science and
the rest of the world remains knotty. Arguments about reﬂexiv-
ity abound and a range of dilemmas has surfaced as a conse-
quence, making it intricate for the scholar to engage with practice.
This article suggests systematization and strategies for tackling
these dilemmas through a focus on practical reﬂexivity: The reﬂex-
ivity about the social and practical positioning or “situatedness”
of researchers in their concrete interactions with political prac-
tice in which they juggle pertinent dilemmas. Social theory ﬂour-
ishes with insight that can help us build coping strategies for
engaging with practice. This article starts a reﬂection on how to
do that.
Our argument unfolds in the following steps. Next we discuss
why the relation between political science and political practice is
conceived as inherently problematic. We brieﬂy discuss the rela-
tion of theory and practice and point tomajor dilemmas that polit-
ical scientists face. We argue that dilemmas have already been
described fairly extensively in the literature, the discussion of how
to cope with them, however, is less developed. Then the following
section discusses ideas from social theory to introduce a range of
coping strategies.We then discuss six diﬀerent strategies for polit-
ical scientists and how they address the dilemmas. We conclude
with a reﬂection on how practical reﬂexivity can move forward.
THE DILEMMAS OF ENGAGINGWITH POLITICAL PRACTICE
Asked about the role of political science for political practice, a
conventional (and indeed convenient) answer lies in pointing to
the irrelevance of social scientiﬁc arguments, ideas, and theories.
This answer is usually supported by pointing to the divergences
between the worlds of science and the worlds of politics and
suggesting the existence of a “gap” that is not easily bridged.
Calls for making social science more relevant and suggestions
for bridging the diagnosed gap ﬂourish within political science
and other disciplines.1 But such a position is too convenient. It
lifts social science above the messiness of politics, conceals the
de facto everyday involvement of science in political aﬀairs—
reaching from merely the value choices theory entails to more
straight-forward political advocacy by academics—and it veils
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science in the myth of detachment and independence. In other
words, embracing a narrative of irrelevance and gaps justiﬁes
ignorance toward questions of the political character of research
or researchers’ social responsibility.
To be fair, political science hosts a project of research that has
frequently and persistently pointed to the insuﬃcient character
of the “gap escape.” For instance in international relations, a line
of thinking reaching from classics HansMorgenthau and Hedley
Bull, to contemporaries Friedrich Kratochwil, Richard Ashley, or
RBJWalker, recurrently stresses that science is neither detached
nor free from value choices. For them, what guarantees the qual-
ity of political science is exactly a reﬂection on the relation between
political science and politics. Yet, while such a line of reasoning
is warmly embraced by researchers who describe themselves as
“critical,” it has often boiled down to an epistemological critique
of positivist ideals that are often preached but rarely practiced.
In other words, scholars have been busy criticizing “the others,”
those they conceive of as the mainstream, the preachers of posi-
tivism. Rarely has this critique been taken forward into a practice
of (self-)reﬂexivity toward a researcher’s own position.
Contrary to this, to embrace the notion of practical reﬂexivity
stresses the idea that the strength of social science relies on being
transparent about one’s own position in social and political con-
texts. It is to reﬂect on the relation of one’s own practices to oth-
ers. This includes reﬂexivity on epistemological, ontological, and
methodological questions and extends also to talking about other
scholarly practices, such as writing and presentation practices,
giving interviews to themedia, or speaking to state oﬃcials (Bue-
ger andGadinger 2007). Extending reﬂexivity in this sense reveals
a range of practical dilemmas academics face in their everyday
engagement with political practice. These dilemmas escape easy
or ready-made solutions, but they can be addressed by perform-
ing practical reﬂexivity. Three core dilemmas, at least, can be
extracted from the everyday life of the critical academic.
First, is the “truth dilemma.” Arguably, since the advents of
modernity scientiﬁc authority has rested on a notion of the truth.
The prevailing convention is that science does not occupy parti-
san interests or advocates distinct policies. Instead, science speaks
truth to power and delivers scientiﬁc certainty on which grounds
policy can be based. Scientists are considered the representatives
of the factual. Yet, critical attacks on the positivist methodology
cast doubt on the possibility to speak in the name of truth and to
deliver universal certainties. Yet, who wants to listen if truth is
not claimed for scientiﬁc results? Will practitioners not always
demand that scientists speak from a position of truth, certainty,
and universalism? So how to question truth, while preserving a
“place from where to speak”?
Second, autonomy is often seen as a prerequisite for system-
atically producing knowledge that is not “tainted” by various
forms of interests (political, economic, status). Autonomy allows
researchers to choose their own methods and research questions
even if these are not embraced by practice. However, autonomy
can lead to detachment and to a secluded life of irrelevance. The
ivory tower is the often-mentioned picture of autonomous research
with no relevance for the world of practice. It gives the researcher
a certain status—at least within the scientiﬁc ﬁeld—but it risks
sidetracking research in practice. So how does one stay autono-
mous, while increasing relevance?
Third, knowledge travels, but it does not travel as a coherent
package insensitive to local contexts. Contextual translation and
interpretation is an integral part of any voyage of knowledge, but
it carries the possibility or risk ofmisinterpretation or abuse.This
dynamic raises the question of the reach of the researcher’s respon-
sibility. If scholars cannot steer the use of their knowledge and
consequences cannot be anticipated, how can they take responsi-
bility for that knowledge? To take it to the extreme, should one
also be responsible for “that majority of the readings and usages
that are misunderstandings?” (Wæver 1999, 336). How do we bal-
ance the tight rope between producing knowledge and not being
able to steer it? Keep silent? Or steel our choices with practical
reﬂexivity and hope for the best?
These three problems are core issues in the relation of academ-
ics to society and policymaking. The problems are dilemmas in
that they present researchers with the choice of two (or more)
alternatives (or “horns”), neither of which are favorable. Truth
cannot be rejected and embraced at the same time, one cannot be
relevant and maintain full autonomy, any utterance has conse-
quences, and silence is no option.There are no easy solutions. But
still we have to cope.
Whilemuchwill hang on individuals probing and experiment-
ing in distinct situations and contexts, we suggest here to struc-
ture reﬂexive practice around a set of “ideal types” or strategies.
These produce a set of guidelines for researchers. Guidelines will
not be translatable directly into practice, and even if institution-
alized in some way would not directly condition action.With this
set-up, however, we hope to provide a structure to the future dis-
cussion of practical reﬂexivity.
SOCIALTHEORY, PRACTICAL REFLEXIVITY, AND COPING
STRATEGIES
In this section, we introduce six strategies for performing practi-
cal reﬂexivity to cope with the described dilemmas. The six
outlines—Pielke’s “honest broker,” Gramsci’s “organic intellec-
tual,” Bourdieu’s “collective intellectual,” Enloe’s “curious expert,”
Haraway’s “situated expert,” andRorty’s “liberal ironist” have been
introduced to the “critical” political science discourse, but have
not been juxtaposed in the interest of spurring a debate on the
directions practical reﬂexivity may take. Although our discussion
of strategies is certainly not exhaustive, it clariﬁes a variety of
productive answers to cope with dilemmas.
If scholars cannot steer the use of their knowledge and consequences cannot be anticipated,
how can they take responsibility for that knowledge?To take it to the extreme, should one
also be responsible for “that majority of the readings and usages that are
misunderstandings?” (Wæver 1999, 336).
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The Honest Broker
Policy studies and the sociology of science have a long-standing
interest in how science contributes to policy processes. From this
debate, Roger Pielke develops the notion of the scientist as an
“honest broker.” Pielke sees this strategy as a way of fertilizing
the connections of science with policymaking rather than trying
to keep them separate. “[P]erhaps somewhat ironically, the best
way to diminish the role of politics in scientiﬁc institutions is not
to pretend that science and politics can be kept separate” (Pielke
2007, 149). Pielke sees the need for honest brokers as notably aris-
ing in contexts with a degree of high uncertainty and a conﬂict of
values at stake. In such situations, scientists have often acted as
stealth “issue advocates.” Contrary to these, Pielke sees the core
function of honest brokers in widening the availability of policy
choices, instead of closing debate by scientiﬁcally justifying only
one option. The honest broker aims at dismissing that only one
option is scientiﬁcally supported andplaces “scientiﬁc understand-
ings in the context of a smorgasbord of policy options” (Pielke
2007, 17).
Thus, honest brokering is an explicit strategy to cope with the
three dilemmas. It replaces the importance of truth with the task
of clarifying options; it sees transparent and “honest” engage-
ment with policy practice as a path to restoring autonomy; and by
seeing scientists’ roles as opening rather than closing oﬀ policy
discourse, it softens the steerability problem.
The Organic Intellectual
In a more classical version of the role of the intellectual, Antonio
Gramsci holds that “all men are intellectuals [. . .]: but not all men
have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci 1971a, 140;
italics added). The intellectual function comes in two versions:
the traditional and the organic intellectual. Traditional intellec-
tuals consider themselves as “freeﬂoating thinkers” (Wyn Jones
1995, 305), but are in fact “the dominant group’s ‘deputies’ exer-
cising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political
government” (Gramsci 1971a, 145). The organic intellectual, in
contrast, is situated within a certain structure and can help over-
throw it fromwithin by turning attention to the relations of dom-
ination in a society (the Marxist roots are pretty clear). Thus, the
organic intellectual carries emancipatory potential andhas an obli-
gation to act. The path to emancipation lies in education and the
construction of an “alternative intellectual-moral block” (Gram-
sci 1971b, 641). This situation risks turning the intellectual into a
politician. But following neo-Gramscians in political science (e.g.,
Booth 1994; Lawson 2008; Wyn Jones 1995) a path may lie in
constantly turning the structures of academic domination on their
heads: by inviting scholars working in academically dominated
places to speak; by writing on subjects which are silenced; by con-
stantly speaking for the underprivileged (whatever thatmaymean
in a given time or space).
The organic intellectual’s strategy makes steering knowledge
easier: when teaching and acting go hand in hand, the gap between
knowledge production and practice is closed. Also autonomy is
only a value when directed at the dominant truth regime. The
bottom-up truth as seen from the “have-nots” should be embod-
ied, not regarded from a distance.
The Collective Intellectual
To Pierre Bourdieu, expert status is produced in a scientiﬁc ﬁeld,
set apart from political practice (Berling 2012; Bourdieu 2004).
Intellectuals ﬁnd themselves in positions where acceptance in the
scientiﬁc ﬁeld is a prerequisite for gaining “a place from where to
speak” in the overall power structure of a society. This hinges on
doing research in a certain way that is accepted by the scientiﬁc
community. Bourdieu chose “clinical sociology” that focuses on
laying bare and challenging “doxic practice,” that is, common
understandings, through empirical research, and by performing
critical analysis also on the sciences.
The potential for academically driven change is limited, how-
ever, because “intellectuals [. . .] occupy a dominated position in
the ﬁeld of power” (Bourdieu 1993, 125). Intellectuals often repro-
duce the doxic understandings of power relations and therefore
risk “consecrating” the existing power structure. Bourdieu’s pro-
posed solution is the creation of collectives of intellectuals who
agree on methodology and a desire to challenge social laws. Crit-
ical analysis can remain agnostic to what is “really real” (Pouliot
2007, 363)—or true in an objectivist sense—as long as themethod-
ology is rigorous and the research is cumulative. A collective not
only meets the (truth) standards expected by practitioners, but
also fortiﬁes the position of autonomy for the researchers. No
guarantee against distortions or misrepresentations exists, how-
ever, when the knowledge leaves the scientiﬁc community, and
exclusion of alternative research questions andmethods (and per-
haps truths) remains a real risk.
The Curious Expert
From a more practical perspective Enloe has “become more and
more curious about curiosity and its absence” (Enloe 2004, 2).
With this starting point she calls for a renewed (feminist) approach
to politics and aims at expanding the research agenda by empha-
sizing process and curiosity. For instance, she transforms the term
“cheap labor” into “labor made cheap” and spurs the question: by
whom? The answer to this question breeds curiosity about who
beneﬁts from not asking that question. Whose political purpose
does it serve to stay uncurious about the answer? The center and
the margin come into view; the silenced may be given a voice
(Enloe 2004, 20).
For Enloe, words like “tradition,” “always,” “oldest” should
make us alert: these words are tailor-made to close oﬀ questions
about the historicity and temporality of a state of aﬀairs and
Thus, the method of the curious expert is to always consider a long attention span historically
and a readiness to be surprised, to admit to the surprise, and not squeeze it into a
“comfortable, worn conceptual shoe.” The “old shoe” may marginalize a silenced group of
people (Enloe 2004, 13–22).
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domination. Thus, the method of the curious expert is to always
consider a long attention span historically and a readiness to be
surprised, to admit to the surprise, and not squeeze it into a “com-
fortable, worn conceptual shoe.” The “old shoe” may marginalize
a silenced group of people (Enloe 2004, 13–22).
The aim of the curious expert is not explaining, but taking a
“quizzical” stance. The method emphasizes ideas such as not just
addressing the oﬃcial part of a meeting, but arriving before the
meeting and listening to the “oﬀ-hand banter” and joining when
themeeting “continues among a select few down the corridor and
into the pub” (Enloe 2004, 5). In these settings, the “usual,” the
“always,” the “oldest” will be laid bare to the analyst, and quizzi-
cal questionsmay be posed in direct engagement between analyst
and practitioner.
The curious expert has to get close to practice to apply the
method. In this relation, autonomy can be kept by insisting on
demanding an answer to habitual ways of doing things. The truth
dilemma is circumvented by taking a quizzical stance and by act-
ing almost like a consultant in on-going processes. The knowl-
edge may not be popular, and cannot be steered, but in this
dialogical form there is hope that old marginalizations will be
realised and—perhaps—acted on.
The Situated Expert
From a more heavily epistemological viewpoint, Haraway (e.g.,
Haraway 1992) insists on situating knowledge production—and
most importantly objectivist science—in semiotic-material con-
texts: No knowledge is produced from a Kantian “nowhere.” Har-
away stresses the metaphor of vision and argues for si(gh)ting
knowledge—a term that stresses both a temporal and a spatial
situatedness. No truth is constant; no truth is produced without a
semiotic-material presence. This does not mean that knowledge
is located concretely in a territory or in a person. It means that
every perspective excludes a diﬀerent perspective, that every point
of view excludes another point of view, and that working toward
something means turning your back on something else. Being
aware of a multitude of narratives and presenting them as alter-
natives to status quo is objectivity to Haraway—and her way of
dealing with the truth dilemma.
To the situated expert, autonomy relies on revealing that objec-
tivist science is a power practice that should be avoided or at least
countered through deconstruction of central dichotomies (nature/
culture, subject/object, nature/society) and categories (sex, race,
class). To this end, Haraway has carried out deconstruction on a
multitude of “objects.” Cracks in commercials, science ﬁction lit-
erature, art, dog training, technology, the hard sciences, and her
own practices are opened up and a “diﬀraction” is created in the
solid dichotomies that make the objects meaningful. Irony is a
central part of the process of creating diﬀraction and laying bare
situatedness. Steering knowledge is not necessary, because the
partial perspective of any knowledge should always be contested
and supplemented with another.
The Liberal Ironist
Also picking up on irony—but from a pragmatist standpoint—
Rorty deﬁnes the liberal ironist as liberal in the sense that cruelty
is thought to be the worst thing we do, that suﬀering should be
countered, and that solidarity is something to hope for; and as
ironist because the researcher faces the contingency of his own
central beliefs: Everything is historicised, turned on its head, and
countered—including someone’s own ﬁrmest ideas (Rorty 1989).
Science is understood as an activity that aims at controlling
experience and to translate troubled, disturbed, and ambiguous
situations into determinate ones: Science provides means to con-
trol experience and to provide expanded problem-solving proce-
dures. Hence science is crucial for good policies as it assists in
identifying problems and in coping with these. The ironist has no
preferred method and no ﬁrm grip on interests. A constant ques-
tioning of self and other, and a radical take on the equality of
scientiﬁc and other types of method remove the possibility of cre-
ating any privileged role for science.Yet, science is an activity that
produces hope, imagines alternative futures, and may assist in
redescribing problems.
Drawing on a classical pragmatist position, Rorty suggests that
the primary tool for science is language: stressing the contin-
gency of any narrative or vocabulary and developing alternatives
is a pivotal task. Practically, the liberal ironist nourishes under-
standings of the “other” as “one of us,” and sees the “strange suf-
ferer” as a “fellow suﬀerer” (Rorty 1989, xvi). By telling stories of
them and us, the contingency of divisions are brought to the fore.
Dissemination of science can fruitfully take place through the arts.
Ideas are eﬀective not as bare ideas, but because they have imag-
inative content and emotional appeal.Through ethnography, jour-
nalist reports, comic books, docudrama, and especially novels,
stories of the other can be advanced (Rorty 1989).
In sum, the ironists address the truth dilemma in attempting
to demonstrate the contingency of any truth claim (including their
own), they reject that autonomy is a relevant precondition for
science (exactly the opposite is argued!), and if ironists are suc-
cessful in guaranteeing that any knowledge is recognized as con-
tingent, then indeed the non-steerability problem also loses its
drama.
WHITHER PRACTICAL REFLEXIVITY? STRATEGIES FOR
COPINGWITH PRACTICE
These six outlines clarify that coping strategies for the dilemmas
canbe identiﬁed.A commongoal of challenging comfortable truths
is met through diﬀerent conceptions of interests, methods, and
contingency. Some are more distant to ideas of critique, whereas
others see it as a prerequisite for being heard. Some see the ﬁght
A common goal of challenging comfortable truths is met through diﬀerent conceptions of
interests, methods, and contingency. Some are more distant to ideas of critique, whereas
others see it as a prerequisite for being heard. Some see the ﬁght for certain interests as the
main project of academia, whereas others see the challenge in itself as the goal.
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for certain interests as themain project of academia, whereas oth-
ers see the challenge in itself as the goal. Some stress contingency,
irony, and narrative structure while others stress empirical detail
or proximity to practitioners. Together they give us a sense of the
joys and pitfalls of engaging with society as intellectuals and
experts. And, importantly, they add a dimension of practical reﬂex-
ivity to the debate about intellectualismand expertise today.Where
is the expert situated in the social structure?How is expert author-
ity produced? The answers to these questions carry important
insight for the individual researcher when contemplating speak-
ing on the behalf of others, choosing a particular researchmethod,
or a particular (public) outlet to publish results. Will your next
publication be a piece of art?
The “ideal types” or strategieswe discussed do not dictate solu-
tions, but they exemplify dimensions of reﬂexivity and practices
that can be taken as inspiration to experimentwith diﬀerent ways
of reacting to the dilemmas.Thinking about the dilemmas, exper-
imentingwith new forms of elite and public engagements presents
a way to further and indeed routinize practical reﬂexivity in polit-
ical science. After all, “[t]he bottom line is that scientists have
choices about how they engage the broader society of which they
are part. Hiding behind science is simply not a productive option”
(Pielke 2007, 152).
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NOTE
1. See, for instance, George (1994), Eriksson and Sundelius (2005),Walt (2005), or
Anderson (2003), for a critique see Bueger and Gadinger (2007), and Bueger
and Villumsen (2007).
REFERENCES
Anderson, Lisa. 2003. PursuingTruth, Exercising Power: Social Science and Public
Policy in the 21st Century. NewYork: Columbia University Press.
Berling, Trine Villumsen 2012. “Knowledges.” In Bourdieu in International Rela-
tions: Rethinking Key Concepts in IR, ed. R. Adler-Nissen, 59–77. London:
Routledge.
Booth, K. 1994. “Security and Self. Reﬂections of a Fallen Realist.” YCISS Occa-
sional Paper 26.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1993. The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature,
ed. R. Johnson. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre. 2004. Science of Science and Reﬂexivity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bueger, Christian, and Frank Gadinger. 2007. “Reassembling and Dissecting: In-
ternational Relations Practice from a Science Studies Perspective.” Inter-
national Studies Perspectives 8 (1): 90–110.
Bueger, Christian, and Trine Villumsen. 2007. “Beyond the Gap: Relevance, Fields
of Practice and the Securitizing Consequences of (Democratic Peace) Re-
search.” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (4): 417–48.
Enloe, Cynthia. 2004. The Curious Feminist: Searching forWomen in a New Age of
Empire. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Eriksson, Johan, and Bengt Sundelius. 2005. “Molding Minds that Form Policy:
How to Make Research Useful.” International Studies Perspectives 6: 51–72.
George, Alexander L. 1994. “Some Guides to Bridging the Gap.”Mershon Inter-
national Studies Review 38 (1): 171–72.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971a. “The Intellectuals.” In Selections from the Prison Note-
books of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, 131–61. London: Law-
rence & Wishart.
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971b. “The Study of Philosophy.” In Selections from the Prison
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, ed. Q. Hoare and G. N. Smith, 624–707. London:
Lawrence & Wishart.
Haraway, Donna. 1992. “The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for
Inappropriated Others.” In Cultural Studies, ed. L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, and P.
Treichler, 295–337. London: Routledge.
Lawson, G. 2008. “For a Public International Relations.” International Political
Sociology 2 (1): 17–37.
Pielke, Roger A., Jr. 2007. The Honest Broker. Making Sense of Science in Policy and
Politics. Cambridge; NewYork: Cambridge University Press.
Pouliot, Vincent. 2007. “‘Sobjectivism’: Toward a Constructivist Methodology.”
International Studies Quarterly 51 (2): 359–84.
Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge; NewYork:
Cambridge University Press.
Wæver, O. 1999. “Securitizing Sectors? Reply to Eriksson.” Cooperation and Conﬂict
34 (3): 334–40.
Walt, Stephen M. 2005. “The Relationship between Theory and Policy in Inter-
national Relations.” Annual Review of Political Science 8: 23–48.
Wyn Jones, R. 1995. “‘Message in a Bottle’? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security
Studies.” Contemporary Security Policy 16 (3): 299–319.
.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
PS • January 2013 119
